The Matter of the Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience, and Reduction

Blackwell Pub. (2007)
Abstract
The Matter of the Mind addresses and illuminates the relationship between psychology and neuroscience by focusing on the topic of reduction. Written by leading philosophers in the field Discusses recent theorizing in the mind-brain sciences and reviews and weighs the evidence in favour of reductionism against the backdrop of recent important advances within psychology and the neurosciences Collects the latest work on central topics where neuroscience is now making inroads in traditional psychological terrain, such as adaptive behaviour, reward systems, consciousness, and social cognition
Keywords Reductionism  Neurosciences Philosophy  Psychology Philosophy
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Call number B835.5.M38 2007
ISBN(s) 1405144432   9781405144438   1405172762   9781405172769   9781444350869   1444350862
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