David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 155 (3):345-369 (2011)
This paper proposes a causal-dispositional account of rule-following as it occurs in reasoning and intentional agency. It defends this view against Kripke’s (1982) objection to dispositional accounts of rule-following, and it proposes a solution to the problem of deviant causal chains. In the first part, I will outline the causal-dispositional approach. In the second part, I will follow Martin and Heil’s (1998) realist response to Kripke’s challenge. I will propose an account that distinguishes between two kinds of rule-conformity and two kinds of rule-following, and I will defend the realist approach against two challenges that have recently been raised by Handfield and Bird (2008). In the third part, I will turn to the problem of deviant causal chains, and I will propose a new solution that is partly based on the realist account of rule-following.
|Keywords||Rule-following Reasoning Deviant causal chains Dispositions Metaphysics of mind Metaphysics of agency|
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References found in this work BETA
Allan Gibbard (1990). Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment. Harvard University Press.
Noam Chomsky (1965). Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. The MIT Press.
Saul A. Kripke (1982). Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Harvard University Press.
Gilbert Harman (1973). Thought. Princeton University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Markus E. Schlosser (2012). Taking Something as a Reason for Action. Philosophical Papers 41 (2):267-304.
Manuel García-Carpintero (2012). Foundational Semantics II: Normative Accounts. Philosophy Compass 7 (6):410-421.
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