David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind and Language 24 (5):523-553 (2009)
The core of the language of thought program is the claim that thinking is the manipulation of symbols according to rules. Yet LOT has said little about symbol natures, and existing accounts are highly controversial. This is a major flaw at the heart of the LOT program: LOT requires an account of symbol natures to naturalize intentionality, to determine whether the brain even engages in symbol manipulations, and to understand how symbols relate to lower-level neurocomputational states. This paper provides the much-needed theory of symbols, and in doing so, alters the LOT program in significant respects.
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Citations of this work BETA
Matthew Rellihan (2013). Informational Semantics and Frege Cases. Acta Analytica 28 (3):267-294.
Susan Schneider (2010). Conceptual Atomism Rethought. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):224-225.
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