The Notion of "Incitement"

Philosophy and Rhetoric 7 (2):89 - 97 (1974)
The main purpose of this paper is to answer the question of how it is that a person who incites another to do something can be held morally responsible for this second person's acts. Professor bruce franklin's dismissal from stanford university is taken as the main example and it is argued that though those incited act 'because' of what the incitor does, This 'because' is not explainable on the standard models of physical causation, Coercion or hypnosis. It is closer to the truth to think of the incitor as arguing, To those incited, That they should perform some action
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DOI 10.2307/40236878
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