The nature of inclination

Ethics 119 (2):229–256 (2009)
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Abstract

There is a puzzle in the very notion of passive motivation ("passion" or "inclination"). To be motivated is not simply to be moved from the outside. Motivation is in some sense self-movement. But how can an agent be passive with respect to her own motivation? How is passive motivation possible? In this paper I defend the ancient view that inclination stems from a motivational source independent of reason, a motivational source that is both agential and nonrational.

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Tamar Schapiro
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Citations of this work

The Intellectual Given.John Bengson - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):707-760.
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A system of rational faculties: Additive or transformative?Karl Schafer - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (4):918-936.

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