The negative reason existential fallacy
| Abstract | This style of argument comes up everywhere in the philosophy of practical reason, leveled against theories of the norm of means-end coherence on intention, against Humean theories of reasons, and many other places. It comes up in normative moral theory – for example, in arguments against buck-passing. It comes up in epistemology, in discussions of how to account for the rational connection between believing the premises of a valid argument and believing its conclusion. And it comes up in political philosophy, where one of its most salient occurrences is in the so-called ‘leveling down’ objection to egalitarianism. | |||||||||
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Chrisoula Andreou (2005). The Voices of Reason. American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (1):33 - 45.
Mark Jago & Stephen Barker (2011). Being Positive About Negative Facts. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):117-138.
Daan Evers (2009). Humean Agent-Neutral Reasons? Philosophical Explorations 12 (1):55 – 67.
John Turri (2011). Believing For a Reason. Erkenntnis 74 (3):383-397.
Jussi Suikkanen (2005). Reasons and Value – in Defence of the Buck-Passing Account. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (5):513 - 535.
Guy Kahane (2010). Feeling Pain for the Very First Time: The Normative Knowledge Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):20-49.
David Botting (2011). Can 'Big' Questions Be Begged? Argumentation 25 (1):23-36.
Mark Schroeder (2011). Buck-Passers' Negative Thesis. Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):341-347.
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