Trumping preemption

Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):165-181 (2000)
Extant counterfactual accounts of causation (CACs) still cannot handle preemptive causation. I describe a new variety of preemption, defend its possibility, and use it to show the inadequacy of extant CACs. Imagine that it is a law of nature that the first spell cast on a given day match the enchantment that midnight.
Keywords causation
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DOI jphil200497436
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John Bengson (2013). Experimental Attacks on Intuitions and Answers. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):495-532.
Neil McDonnell (2016). Events and Their Counterparts. Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1291-1308.
Sungho Choi (2005). Dispositions and Mimickers. Philosophical Studies 122 (2):183 - 188.

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