The Particularity and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience

Philosophical Studies 149 (1):19 - 48 (2010)
Abstract
I argue that any account of perceptual experience should satisfy the following two desiderata. First, it should account for the particularity of perceptual experience, that is, it should account for the mind-independent object of an experience making a difference to individuating the experience. Second, it should explain the possibility that perceptual relations to distinct environments could yield subjectively indistinguishable experiences. Relational views of perceptual experience can easily satisfy the first but not the second desideratum. Representational views can easily satisfy the second but not the first desideratum. I argue that to satisfy both desiderata perceptual experience is best conceived of as fundamentally both relational and representational. I develop a view of perceptual experience that synthesizes the virtues of relationalism and representationalism, by arguing that perceptual content is constituted by potentially gappy de re modes of presentation.
Keywords Perceptual Experience  Relationalism  Representationalism  Gappy Content  Particularity
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References found in this work BETA
David Braun (1993). Empty Names. Noûs 27 (4):449-469.
Bill Brewer (2006). Perception and Content. European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):165-181.
Bill Brewer (2007). Perception and its Objects. Philosophical Studies 132 (1):87-97.

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Citations of this work BETA
Susanna Schellenberg (2011). Ontological Minimalism About Phenomenology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):1-40.
Fiona Macpherson (2011). Cross-Modal Experiences. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):429-468.
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