David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Synthese 169:201 - 216 (2009)
In this paper I defend the theory that knowledge is credit-worthy true belief against a family of objections, one of which was leveled against it in a recent paper by Jennifer Lackey. In that paper, Lackey argues that testimonial knowledge is problematic for the credit-worthiness theory because when person A comes to know that p by way of the testimony of person B, it would appear that any credit due to A for coming to believe truly that p belongs to the testifier, B, rather than the hearer, A. If so, then knowledge would appear not to be a matter of credit for true belief. I think that the problem this raises actually has little to do with the fact that the knowledge comes by way of testimony, and that similar objections can be formulated in terms of perceptual and memorial knowledge. I will attempt to neutralize these objections by drawing a distinction between credit as praiseworthiness and credit as attributability
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Jennifer Lackey (2008). What Luck is Not. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):255 – 267.
Similar books and articles
Anne Meylan (2011). Epistemic Circularity and the Problem of Cheap Credit. Philosophical Papers 40 (3):327-340.
Marek Hudon (2009). Should Access to Credit Be a Right? Journal of Business Ethics 84 (1):17 - 28.
Krist Vaesen (2011). Knowledge Without Credit, Exhibit 4: Extended Cognition. [REVIEW] Synthese 181 (515):529.
John Greco (2003). ``Knowledge as Credit for True Belief&Quot;. In Michael DePaul & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives From Ethics and Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 111-134.
Wayne Riggs (2007). Why Epistemologists Are so Down on Their Luck. Synthese 158 (3):329 - 344.
Jason Baehr (2012). Credit Theories and the Value of Knowledge. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):1-22.
Benjamin McMyler (2012). Responsibility for Testimonial Belief. Erkenntnis 76 (3):337-352.
Jennifer Lackey (2009). Knowledge and Credit. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):27 - 42.
Jennifer Lackey (2007). Why We Don't Deserve Credit for Everything We Know. Synthese 158 (3):345--361.
Wayne Riggs (2009). Two Problems of Easy Credit. Synthese 169 (1):201 - 216.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads29 ( #56,815 of 1,096,394 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #231,754 of 1,096,394 )
How can I increase my downloads?