The primacy of fact perception
Philosophical Psychology 25 (4):575 - 593 (2012)
| Abstract | After outlining an enactive account of fact perception, I consider J. L. Austin's discussion of the argument from illusion. From it I draw the conclusion that when fact perception is primary the objects perceived are those involved in the fact. A consideration of Adelson's checkershadow illusion shows that properties as basic as luminance are perceived in the contexts of facts as well. I thus conclude that when facts are perceived they structure our perception of objects and properties. I then argue that which facts are perceived is determined by contexts which are themselves determined by our interests. Here I appeal to Heidegger's views on everyday coping as a foundational form of intentional directedness. A discussion of Simons and Chabris? gorilla experiment provides contemporary empirical support of the Heideggerian analysis. Finally, I argue that there cannot be context-free perception on the enactive account inasmuch as perception, qua action, is always permeated with the interests of the subject | |||||||||
| Keywords | Perception Adelson's Checkershadow Illusion Enactive Account Inattentional Blindness J. L. Austin Wittgenstein Forms of Life Gorilla Experiment Heidegger Alva Noë | |||||||||
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