The primacy of fact perception

Philosophical Psychology 25 (4):575 - 593 (2012)
Abstract
After outlining an enactive account of fact perception, I consider J. L. Austin's discussion of the argument from illusion. From it I draw the conclusion that when fact perception is primary the objects perceived are those involved in the fact. A consideration of Adelson's checkershadow illusion shows that properties as basic as luminance are perceived in the contexts of facts as well. I thus conclude that when facts are perceived they structure our perception of objects and properties. I then argue that which facts are perceived is determined by contexts which are themselves determined by our interests. Here I appeal to Heidegger's views on everyday coping as a foundational form of intentional directedness. A discussion of Simons and Chabris? gorilla experiment provides contemporary empirical support of the Heideggerian analysis. Finally, I argue that there cannot be context-free perception on the enactive account inasmuch as perception, qua action, is always permeated with the interests of the subject
Keywords Perception  Adelson's Checkershadow Illusion  Enactive Account  Inattentional Blindness  J. L. Austin  Wittgenstein  Forms of Life  Gorilla Experiment  Heidegger  Alva Noë
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,392
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 7 references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Jonathan Cohen (2002). The Grand Grand Illusion Illusion. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5-6):141-157.
Kristjan Laasik (2011). On Perceptual Presence. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):439-459.
Jody Graham (1997). Common Sense and Berkeley's Perception by Suggestion. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (3):397 – 423.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2012-01-23

Total downloads

40 ( #43,487 of 1,102,929 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

3 ( #120,755 of 1,102,929 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.