The rationalism in Anil Gupta's "Empiricism and Experience"

Philosophical Studies 152 (1):1 - 15 (2011)
Abstract
In these comments I briefly discuss three aspects of the empiricist account of the epistemic role of experience that Anil Gupta develops in his Empiricism and Experience. First, I discuss the motivations Gupta offers for the claim that the given in experience should be regarded as reliable. Second, I discuss two different ways of conceiving of the epistemic significance of the phenomenology of experience. And third, I discuss whether Gupta's account is able to deliver the anti-skeptical results he intends it to. I close by suggesting that, once fully fleshed out, Gupta's account is best understood in terms of the fusion of certain core ideas within both the empiricist and the rationalist traditions
Keywords Gupta  Empiricism  Experience  Epistemology  Phenomenology  Skepticism
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    John Hawthorne (2002). Deeply Contingent a Priori Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):247-269.
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