The Rejection of Consequentialism: A Philosophical Investigation of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Oxford University Press (1994)
In contemporary philosophy, substantive moral theories are typically classified as either consequentialist or deontological. Standard consequentialist theories insist, roughly, that agents must always act so as to produce the best available outcomes overall. Standard deontological theories, by contrast, maintain that there are some circumstances where one is permitted but not required to produce the best overall results, and still other circumstances in which one is positively forbidden to to do. Classical utilitarianism is the most familiar consequentialist view, but it is widely regarded as an inadequate account of morality. Although Professor Scheffler agrees with this assessment, he also believes that consequentialism seems initially plausible, and that there is a persistent air of paradox surrounding typical deontological views. In this book, therefore, he undertakes to reconsider the rejection of consequentialism. He argues that it is possible to provide a rationale for the view that agents need not always produce the best possible overall outcomes, and this motivates one departure from consequentialism; but he shows that it is surprisingly difficult to provide a satisfactory rationale for the view that there are times when agents must not produce the best possible overall outcomes. He goes on to argue for a hitherto neglected type of moral conception, according to which agents are always permitted, but not always required, to produce the best outcomes.
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$39.91 used (69% off) $124.53 new (1% off) $125.00 direct from Amazon Amazon page|
|Call number||BJ1031.S33 1994|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Guy Kahane (2012). On the Wrong Track: Process and Content in Moral Psychology. Mind and Language 27 (5):519-545.
Brian Berkey (2016). The Demandingness of Morality: Toward a Reflective Equilibrium. Philosophical Studies 173 (11):3015-3035.
Tom Dougherty (2013). Agent-Neutral Deontology. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):527-537.
Barbara H. Fried (2012). Can Contractualism Save Us From Aggregation? Journal of Ethics 16 (1):39-66.
Douglas W. Portmore (2009). Consequentializing. Philosophy Compass 4 (2):329-347.
Similar books and articles
Frances Howard-Snyder (1997). The Rejection of Objective Consequentialism. Utilitas 9 (2):241-248.
Campbell Brown (2011). Consequentialize This. Ethics 121 (4):749-771.
Douglas W. Portmore (2011). Consequentialism and Moral Rationalism. In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. Oxford Univ Pr
James A. Keller (1989). Christianity and Consequentialism. Faith and Philosophy 6 (2):198-206.
Paul Hurley (2009). Beyond Consequentialism. Oxford University Press.
Tim Mulgan (2006). SLOTE'S SATISFICING CONSEQUENTIALISM. Ratio 6 (2):121 - 134.
David Lyons (1985). Book Review:The Rejection of Consequentialism: A Philosophical Investigation of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions. Samuel Scheffler. [REVIEW] Ethics 95 (4):936-.
Onora O'neill (2004). Consequences for Non-Consequentialists. Utilitas 16 (1):1-11.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads209 ( #16,460 of 1,932,454 )
Recent downloads (6 months)11 ( #87,895 of 1,932,454 )
How can I increase my downloads?