David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 28 (2):121-135 (2007)
In this paper, I want to scrutinise the value of utilising the concept of disease for a theory of distributive justice in health care. Although many people believe that the presence of a disease-related condition is a prerequisite of a justified claim on health care resources, the impact of the philosophical debate on the concept of disease is still relatively minor. This is surprising, because how we conceive of disease determines the amount of justified claims on health care resources. Therefore, the severity of scarcity depends on our interpretation of the concept of disease. I want to defend a specific combination of a theory of disease with a theory of distributive justice. A naturalist account of disease, together with sufficientarianism, is able to perform a gate-keeping function regarding entitlements to medical treatment. Although this combination cannot solve all problems of justice in health care, it may inform rationing decisions as well.
|Keywords||disease justice rationing egalitarianism sufficientarianism naturalism normativism|
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References found in this work BETA
Allen E. Buchanan, Dan W. Brock, Norman Daniels & Daniel Wikler (2000). From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice. Cambridge University Press.
Madison Powers & Ruth Faden (2008). Social Justice: The Moral Foundations of Public Health and Health Policy. OUP Usa.
Christopher Boorse (1977). Health as a Theoretical Concept. Philosophy of Science 44 (4):542-573.
Ronald Dworkin (2002). [Book Review] Sovereign Virtue, the Theory and Practice of Equality. [REVIEW] Ethics 112 (2):367-371.
Christopher Boorse (1975). On the Distinction Between Disease and Illness. Philosophy and Public Affairs 5 (1):49-68.
Citations of this work BETA
Niklas Juth (2015). Challenges for Principles of Need in Health Care. Health Care Analysis 23 (1):73-87.
Barbro Fröding & Niklas Juth (2015). Cognitive Enhancement and the Principle of Need. Neuroethics 8 (3):231-242.
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