The Unreliability of Naive Introspection

Philosophical Review 117 (2):245-273 (2008)
Abstract
We are prone to gross error, even in favorable circumstances of extended reflection, about our own ongoing conscious experience, our current phenomenology. Even in this apparently privileged domain, our self-knowledge is faulty and untrustworthy. Examples highlighted in this paper include: emotional experience, peripheral vision, and the phenomenology of thought. Philosophical foundationalism supposing that we infer an external world from secure knowledge of our own consciousness is almost exactly backward
Keywords Introspection
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Citations of this work BETA
Neil Levy (2011). Resisting 'Weakness of the Will'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):134 - 155.
Daniel Greco (2014). A Puzzle About Epistemic Akrasia. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.
Elizabeth Irvine (2012). Old Problems with New Measures in the Science of Consciousness. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (3):627-648.
D. J. Bennett (2012). Seeing Shape: Shape Appearances and Shape Constancy. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (3):487-518.
David B. Martens (2010). First-Person Belief and Empirical Certainty. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (1):118-136.

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