David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):197-218 (2013)
: This paper argues for a distinction between possession of a unified consciousness and possession of a single stream of consciousness. Although the distinction has widespread applicability in discussions of the structure of consciousness and of pathologies of conscious experience, I will illustrate its importance primarily using the debate about consciousness in split-brain subjects, suggesting that those who have argued that split-brain subjects have two streams of consciousness apiece and those who have argued that they have a unified consciousness may both be right
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References found in this work BETA
Alva Noë (2005). Action in Perception. The MIT Press.
Ned Block (1995). On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Susan L. Hurley (1998). Consciousness in Action. Harvard University Press.
Bernard J. Baars (1988). A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
S. Clint Dowland (2015). Embodied Mind Sparsism. Philosophical Studies:1-20.
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