Truth-Making without Truth-Makers

Synthese 152 (1):21-46 (2006)
The article is primarily concerned with the notion of a truth-maker. An explication for this notion is offered, which relates it to other notions of making something such-and-such. In particular, it is shown that the notion of a truth-maker is a close relative of a concept employed by van Inwagen in the formulation of his Consequence Argument. This circumstance helps understanding the general mechanisms of the concepts involved. Thus, a schematic explication of a whole battery of related notions is offered. It is based on an explanatory notion, introduced by the sentential connector “because”, whose function is examined in some detail. Finally, on the basis of the explication proposed, an argument is developed to the effect that the objects usually regarded as truth-makers are not apt to play this role
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Metaphysics   Philosophy of Language
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-004-7905-8
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References found in this work BETA
D. M. Armstrong (1993). A World of States of Affairs. Philosophical Perspectives 7 (3):429-440.
Paul Horwich (2003). Truth. In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), Erkenntnis. Oxford University Press 261-272.

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Citations of this work BETA
Kelly Trogdon (2013). Grounding: Necessary or Contingent? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):465-485.
Benjamin Schnieder (2011). A Logic for 'Because'. Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (3):445-465.
Tuomas E. Tahko (2013). Truth‐Grounding and Transitivity. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (4):332-340.
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2015). Grounding is Not a Strict Order. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (3):517-534.

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