David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 152 (1):21-46 (2006)
The article is primarily concerned with the notion of a truth-maker. An explication for this notion is offered, which relates it to other notions of making something such-and-such. In particular, it is shown that the notion of a truth-maker is a close relative of a concept employed by van Inwagen in the formulation of his Consequence Argument. This circumstance helps understanding the general mechanisms of the concepts involved. Thus, a schematic explication of a whole battery of related notions is offered. It is based on an explanatory notion, introduced by the sentential connector “because”, whose function is examined in some detail. Finally, on the basis of the explication proposed, an argument is developed to the effect that the objects usually regarded as truth-makers are not apt to play this role
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Logic Metaphysics Philosophy of Language|
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References found in this work BETA
Gareth Evans (1982). Varieties of Reference. Oxford University Press.
D. M. Armstrong (1993). A World of States of Affairs. Philosophical Perspectives 7 (3):429-440.
Paul Horwich (2005). Truth. In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), Erkenntnis. Oxford University Press 261-272.
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Citations of this work BETA
Kelly Trogdon (2013). Grounding: Necessary or Contingent? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):465-485.
Benjamin Schnieder (2011). A Logic for 'Because'. Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (3):445-465.
Ben Caplan & David Sanson (2011). Presentism and Truthmaking. Philosophy Compass 6 (3):196-208.
Tuomas E. Tahko (2013). Truth‐Grounding and Transitivity. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (4):332-340.
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2015). Grounding is Not a Strict Order. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (3):517-534.
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