Verisimilitude and Belief Revision. With a Focus on the Relevant Element Account

Erkenntnis 75 (2):203-221 (2011)
The expansion or revision of false theories by true evidence does not always increase their verisimilitude. After a comparison of different notions of verisimilitude the relation between verisimilitude and belief expansion or revision is investigated within the framework of the relevant element account. We are able to find certain interesting conditions under which both the expansion and the revision of theories by true evidence is guaranteed to increase their verisimilitude
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-011-9291-1
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References found in this work BETA
K. R. Popper (1966). Conjectures and Refutations. Les Etudes Philosophiques 21 (3):431-434.
Adam Grove (1988). Two Modellings for Theory Change. Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (2):157-170.

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Citations of this work BETA
Woosuk Park (2014). Misrepresentation in Context. Foundations of Science 19 (4):363-374.

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