Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 80:245-254 (2006)
|Abstract||Many theists and atheists believe that God would not permit an evil unless God’s allowing it (or an evil at least as bad) is required for a greater good. In “The Argument from Particular Horrendous Evils” (and elsewhere) Peter van Inwagen has argued against this belief by appealing to his “No Minimum Claim” (NMC), namely, that it is reasonable to believe there is no minimum amount of evil required for God’s purposes. In this paper I distinguish different formulations of NMC, and, by drawing an instructive parallel to traditional sorites paradoxes, refute Jeff Jordan’s criticism that because morally significant suffering is finitelydiminishable, NMC must be false|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
James A. Keller (1989). The Problem of Evil and the Attributes of God. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 26 (3):155 - 171.
A. M. Weisberger (1999). Suffering Belief: Evil and the Anglo-American Defense of Theism. Peter Lang.
Robert Bass (2011). Many Inscrutable Evils. Ars Disputandi 11:118-132.
Daniel Howard-Snyder (2005). On Rowe's Argument From Particular Horrors. In Kelly Clark (ed.), Readings in Philosophy of Religion. Broadview.
Peter Van Inwagen (2006). The Problem of Evil: The Gifford Lectures Delivered in the University of St. Andrews in 2003. Oxford University Press.
Richard Swinburne (2003). Freedom and Evil. In Julian Baggini & Jeremy Stangroom (eds.), What Philosophers Think. Continuum Press.
James R. Beebe, Logical Problem of Evil. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Bruce Russell (1989). The Persistent Problem of Evil. Faith and Philosophy 6 (2):121-139.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads3 ( #202,008 of 549,124 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,361 of 549,124 )
How can I increase my downloads?