Validity concepts in proof-theoretic semantics

Synthese 148 (3):525 - 571 (2006)
The standard approach to what I call “proof-theoretic semantics”, which is mainly due to Dummett and Prawitz, attempts to give a semantics of proofs by defining what counts as a valid proof. After a discussion of the general aims of proof-theoretic semantics, this paper investigates in detail various notions of proof-theoretic validity and offers certain improvements of the definitions given by Prawitz. Particular emphasis is placed on the relationship between semantic validity concepts and validity concepts used in normalization theory. It is argued that these two sorts of concepts must be kept strictly apart.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Metaphysics   Philosophy of Language
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DOI 10.2307/20118708
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Ross Thomas Brady (2010). Free Semantics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (5):511 - 529.
Paul Piwek (2007). Meaning and Dialogue Coherence: A Proof-Theoretic Investigation. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 16 (4):403-421.

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