Why Bayesians Needn't Be Afraid of Observing Many Non-black Non-ravens

Abstract
According to Hempel’s raven paradox, the observation of one non-black non-raven confirms the hypothesis that all ravens are black. Bayesians such as Howson and Urbach (Scientific reasoning: the Bayesian approach, 2nd edn. Open Court, Chicago, 1993 ) claim that the raven paradox can be solved by spelling out the concept of confirmation in the sense of the relevance criterion. Siebel (J Gen Philos Sci 35:313–329, 2004 ) disputes the adequacy of this Bayesian solution. He claims that spelling out the concept of confirmation in the relevance sense lets the raven paradox reappear as soon as numerous non-black non-ravens are observed. It is shown in this paper that Siebel’s objection to the Bayesian solution is flawed. Nevertheless, the objection made by Siebel may give us an idea of how Bayesians can successfully handle situations in which we observe more than one non-black non-raven
Keywords Bayesian epistemology  Confirmation  Probability  Raven paradox  Relevance criterion
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,371
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 9 references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Mark Siebel (2004). Der Rabe Und der Bayesianist. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 35 (2):313 - 329.
Robert J. Levy (1988). Regarding the Raven Paradox. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:17 - 23.
Ernest W. Adams (1988). Confirming Inexact Generalizations. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:10 - 16.
Jon Williamson (2007). Inductive Influence. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (4):689 - 708.
Herbert A. Simon (1991). Black Ravens and a White Shoe. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (3):339-342.
Patrick Maher (2005). Qualitative Confirmation and the Ravens Paradox. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1):89-108.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2012-03-14

Total downloads

21 ( #82,758 of 1,102,835 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

3 ( #120,475 of 1,102,835 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.