Whatever Binds the World's Innermost Core Together Outline of a General Theory of Ontic Predication

Axiomathes 23 (2):419-442 (2013)
Abstract
Nexuses such as exemplification are the fundamental ties that structure reality as a whole. They are “formal” in the sense of constituting the form, not the matter of reality and they are “transcendental” inasmuch as they transcend the categorial distinctions between the denizens of reality, including that between existents and non-existents. I shall advocate a moderately particularist view about (external) nexuses and argue that it provides not only the best solution to Bradley’s regress, but also an elegant account of symmetrical relations (both formal and material), as well as of temporal and modal change. These advantages are illustrated by the reconstruction of an Aristotelian ontology of exemplification involving substances, kinds and material attributes
Keywords Transcendental relations  Formal relations  Nexuses  Ontic predication  Exemplification  Occurrents  Symmetrical relations
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D. M. Armstrong (1993). A World of States of Affairs. Philosophical Perspectives 7:429-440.

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