David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (4):607-644 (2011)
There are well-known quasi-formal arguments that identity is a "strict" relation in at least the following three senses: (1) There is a single identity relation and a single distinctness relation; (2) There are no contingent cases of identity or distinctness; and (3) There are no vague or indeterminate cases of identity or distinctness. However, the situation is less clear cut than it at first may appear. There is a natural formal theory of identity that is very close to the standard classical theory but which does not validate the formal analogues of (1)-(3). The core idea is simple: We weaken the Principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals from a conditional to an entailment and we adopt a weakly classical logic. This paper investigates this weakly classical theory of identity (and related theories) and discusses its philosophical ramications. It argues that we can accept a reasonable theory of identity without committing ourselves to the uniqueness, necessity, or determinacy of identity.
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References found in this work BETA
Ken Akiba (2004). Vagueness in the World. Noûs 38 (3):407–429.
Ruth C. Barcan (1947). The Identity of Individuals in a Strict Functional Calculus of Second Order. Journal of Symbolic Logic 12 (1):12-15.
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Citations of this work BETA
Joshua Schechter (2011). Weakly Classical Theories of Identity. Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (4):607-644.
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