David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Noûs 41 (1):110–132 (2007)
This paper addresses the two extensional objections to the Humean Theory of Reasons—that it allows for too many reasons, and that it allows for too few. Although I won’t argue so here, manyof the other objections to the Humean Theoryof Reasons turn on assuming that it cannot successfully deal with these two objections.1 What I will argue, is that the force of the too many and the too few objections to the Humean Theorydepend on whether we assume that Humeans are committed to a thesis about the weight of reasons—one I call Proportionalism. In particular, I’ll show how a version of the Humean Theorythat rejects Proportionalism can reasonablyhope to escape both the too many and the too few objections. This will constitute my defense of this version of the Humean Theory. But then, separately, I will argue that this defense of the Humean Theoryis not ad hoc. I’ll argue that Humeans have no reason to accept Proportionalism in the first place. Or at least, no weightyone. There are three parts to the paper. In Part 1 we introduce the Humean Theoryand the too few reasons objection. I’ll first layout the objection, and then layout the basis for a response on behalf of myfavored version of the Humean Theory. There will be an obvious objection to my defense— but it will turn out to depend on the assumption of Proportionalism. This will constitute myargument that the susceptibilityof the Humean Theoryto..
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References found in this work BETA
David Brink (1997). Kantian Rationalism: Inescapability, Authority, and Supremacy. In Garrett Cullity & Berys Nigel Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford University Press. 255--291.
Sarah Broadie (1991). Ethics with Aristotle. Oxford University Press.
Philippa Foot (2001). Natural Goodness. Oxford University Press.
Richard Joyce (2001). The Myth of Morality. Cambridge University Press.
Christine M. Korsgaard (1997). The Normativity of Instrumental Reason. In Garrett Cullity & Berys Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Nicholas Shackel (2014). Still Waiting for a Plausible Humean Theory of Reasons. Philosophical Studies 167 (3):607-633.
Mark Schroeder (2009). Means-End Coherence, Stringency, and Subjective Reasons. Philosophical Studies 143 (2):223 - 248.
Mark Schroeder (2011). Holism, Weight, and Undercutting. Noûs 45 (2):328 - 344.
Steven Arkonovich (2013). Varieties of Reasons/Motives Internalism. Philosophy Compass 8 (3):210-219.
Mark Schroeder (2011). Buck-Passers' Negative Thesis. Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):341-347.
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