David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy Compass 3 (4):703-720 (2008)
In the 1960s, Peter Geach and John Searle independently posed an important objection to the wide class of 'noncognitivist' metaethical views that had at that time been dominant and widely defended for a quarter of a century. The problems raised by that objection have come to be known in the literature as the Frege-Geach Problem, because of Geach's attribution of the objection to Frege's distinction between content and assertoric force, and the problem has since occupied a great deal of the attention both of defenders of broadly noncognitivist views, and of their critics. In this article I explain Geach and Searle's historical objections, and put the subsequent discussion into dialectical context, paying some attention to the developments along the way and how they have enhanced our overall understanding of the problem. The article covers a lot of territory, so we will only be able to see the highlights, along the way. For further reading, see the Works Cited.
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References found in this work BETA
Allan Gibbard (2003). Thinking How to Live. Harvard University Press.
Allan Gibbard (1990). Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment. Harvard University Press.
Simon Blackburn (1998/2000). Ruling Passions. Oxford University Press.
Simon Blackburn (1984). Spreading the Word. Clarendon Press.
Simon Blackburn (1993). Essays in Quasi-Realism. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Nate Charlow (2014). The Problem with the Frege–Geach Problem. Philosophical Studies 167 (3):635-665.
Mark Schroeder (2008). How Expressivists Can and Should Solve Their Problem with Negation. Noûs 42 (4):573-599.
Matthew Chrisman (2012). Epistemic Expressivism. Philosophy Compass 7 (2):118-126.
Alex Silk (2015). How to Be an Ethical Expressivist. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):47-81.
Ross P. Cameron (2010). The Grounds of Necessity. Philosophy Compass 5 (4):348-358.
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P. T. Geach (1960). Ascriptivism. Philosophical Review 69 (2):221-225.
Paul Horwich (2005). The Frege‐Geach Point. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):78–93.
Daniel Rothschild (2012). Expressing Credences. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (1pt1):99-114.
J. Skorupski (2012). The Frege-Geach Objection to Expressivism: Still Unanswered. Analysis 72 (1):9-18.
Matti Eklund (2009). The Frege–Geach Problem and Kalderon's Moral Fictionalism. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (237):705-712.
Nicholas Unwin (1999). Quasi-Realism, Negation and the Frege-Geach Problem. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (196):337-352.
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