Why property dualists must reject substance physicalism

Philosophical Studies 157 (1):61-76 (2012)
I argue that property dualists cannot hold that minds are physical substances. The focus of my discussion is a property dualism that takes qualia to be sui generis features of reality
Keywords Property dualism  David Chalmers  Jaegwon Kim  Qualia  Substance dualism  Substance  Mind  Non-reductive physicalism  Consciousness  Bundle theory  Substratum theory  Physicalism  Materialism
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9618-9
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References found in this work BETA
Frank Jackson (1982). Epiphenomenal Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.

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