Why property dualists must reject substance physicalism

Philosophical Studies 157 (1):61-76 (2012)
Abstract
I argue that property dualists cannot hold that minds are physical substances. The focus of my discussion is a property dualism that takes qualia to be sui generis features of reality
Keywords Property dualism  David Chalmers  Jaegwon Kim  Qualia  Substance dualism  Substance  Mind  Non-reductive physicalism  Consciousness  Bundle theory  Substratum theory  Physicalism  Materialism
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References found in this work BETA
D. M. Armstrong (1993). A World of States of Affairs. Philosophical Perspectives 7:429-440.
Keith Campbell (1981). The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6 (1):477-488.
Tim Crane (2003). Mental Substances. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Minds and Persons. Cambridge University Press. 229-250.

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