David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):505-522 (2010)
One popular materialist response to the explanatory gap identifies phenomenal concepts with type-demonstrative concepts. This kind of response, however, faces a serious challenge: that our phenomenal concepts seem to provide a richer characterization of their referents than just the demonstrative characterization of 'that quality'. In this paper, I develop a materialist account that beefs up the contents of phenomenal concepts while retaining the idea that these contents contain demonstrative elements. I illustrate this account by focusing on our phenomenal concepts of phenomenal colour. The phenomenal colours stand in a similarity space relative to one another in virtue of being complex qualities—qualities that contain saturation, lightness, and various aspects of hue as component elements. Our phenomenal concepts, in turn, provide a demonstrative characterization of each of these component elements as well as a description of how much of that element is present in a given phenomenal colour. The result is an account where phenomenal concepts contain demonstrative elements and yet provide a significantly richer characterization of the intrinsic nature of their referents than just 'that quality'.
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References found in this work BETA
W. V. Quine (1969). Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. Columbia University Press.
David Hume (1739/2000). A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford University Press.
Michael Tye (2003). Consciousness, Color, and Content. Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233 - 235.
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Citations of this work BETA
Keith Allen (2015). Colour Physicalism, Naïve Realism, and the Argument From Structure. Minds and Machines 25 (2):193-212.
Philip Goff (forthcoming). Fundamentality and the Mind-Body Problem. Erkenntnis:1-18.
Bénédicte Veillet (2015). The Cognitive Significance of Phenomenal Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2955-2974.
Robert Schroer (2013). Do the Primary and Secondary Intensions of Phenomenal Concepts Coincide in All Worlds? Dialectica 67 (4):561-577.
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