Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):167-168 (1999)
|Abstract||Neither of the explanations O'Brien & Opie offer to account for “subject unity” succeeds. Subject unity cannot arise from constructed personal narratives, because such narratives presuppose a prior unity of experience. Subject unity also cannot arise from projection of experiences to the same position in space, as reflection on pregnant women and the spatially deluded reveals.|
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