Distinguishing the senses

Philosophical Explorations 10 (3):257 – 262 (2007)
Seeing, hearing and touching are phenomenally different, even if we are detecting the same spatial properties with each sense. This presents a prima facie problem for intentionalism, the theory that phenomenal character supervenes on representational content. The paper reviews some attempts to resolve this problem, and then looks in detail at Peter Carruthers' recent proposal that the senses can be individuated by the way in which they represent spatial properties and incorporate time. This proposal is shown to be ineffective in distinguishing auditory from either visual or tactual perception, and substantial classes of visual and tactual perceptions are found that the posited spatial and temporal features fail to individuate.
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DOI 10.1080/13869790701535261
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References found in this work BETA
Ned Block (1990). Inverted Earth. Philosophical Perspectives 4:53-79.

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Matthew Ratcliffe (2012). What is Touch? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):413 - 432.

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