David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
History and Philosophy of Logic 23 (4):241-252 (2002)
An examination of a particular passage in Cicero's De fato?Fat. 13?17?is crucial to our understanding of the Stoic theory of the truth-conditions of conditional propositions, for it has been uniquely important in the debate concerning the kind of connection the antecedent and consequent of a Stoic conditional should have to one another. Frede has argued that the passage proves that the connection is one of logical necessity, while Sorabji has argued that positive Stoic attitudes toward empirical inferences elsewhere suggest that that cannot be the right interpretation of the passage. I argue that both parties to the debate have missed a position somewhere between them which both renders a connection between antecedent and consequent that is not merely empirical and makes sense of the actual uses to which the Stoics put the conditional. This will be an account which grounds the connection between antecedent and consequent in a prolêpsis, a special kind of concept which plays a special epistemological role for the Stoics, especially in grounding scientific explanations. My contention will be that Stoic conditionals are true when there is a conceptually necessary connection between antecedent and consequent such that the former explains the latter via a prolêpsis
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
A. A. Long & D. N. Sedley (1987). The Hellenistic Philosophers. Cambridge University Press.
Sextus (2000). Outlines of Scepticism. Cambridge University Press.
Susanne Bobzien (1998). Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
Diogenes Laertius (1942). Lives of Eminent Philosophers. London, W. Heinemann Ltd.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Robert C. Stalnaker (1970). Probability and Conditionals. Philosophy of Science 37 (1):64-80.
Rani Lill Anjum (2008). Three Dogmas of 'If'. In A. Leirfall & T. Sandmel (eds.), Enhet i Mangfold. Unipub
Gunnar Björnsson (2011). Towards a Radically Pragmatic Theory of If-Conditionals. In K. P. Turner (ed.), Making Semantics Pragmatic (CRiSPI, Vol. 24). Emerald
Timothy Williamson (2006). Indicative Versus Subjunctive Conditionals, Congruential Versus Non-Hyperintensional Contexts. Philosophical Issues 16 (1):310–333.
A. J. B. Fugard, Niki Pfeifer & B. Mayerhofer (2011). Probabilistic Theories of Reasoning Need Pragmatics Too: Modulating Relevance in Uncertain Conditionals. Journal of Pragmatics 43:2034–2042.
Harry Ide (1992). Chrysippus's Response to Diodorus's Master Argument. History and Philosophy of Logic 13 (2):133-148.
Sara Verbrugge, Kristien Dieussaert, Walter Schaeken, Hans Smessaert & William Van Belle (2007). Pronounced Inferences: A Study on Inferential Conditionals. Thinking and Reasoning 13 (2):105 – 133.
William Lycan (2006). Conditional-Assertion Theories of Conditionals. In Judith Jarvis Thomson & Alex Byrne (eds.), Content and Modality: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker. Oxford University Press 148--164.
Michael J. White (1986). The Fourth Account of Conditionals in Sextus Empiricus. History and Philosophy of Logic 7 (1):1-14.
Added to index2010-08-10
Total downloads17 ( #224,054 of 1,911,526 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #457,720 of 1,911,526 )
How can I increase my downloads?