David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (1):585-642 (1990)
Cognitive science typically postulates unconscious mental phenomena, computational or otherwise, to explain cognitive capacities. The mental phenomena in question are supposed to be inaccessible in principle to consciousness. I try to show that this is a mistake, because all unconscious intentionality must be accessible in principle to consciousness; we have no notion of intrinsic intentionality except in terms of its accessibility to consciousness. I call this claim the The argument for it proceeds in six steps. The essential point is that intrinsic intentionality has aspectual shape: Our mental representations represent the world under specific aspects, and these aspectual features are essential to a mental state's being the state that it is
|Keywords||Cognitive Consciousness Psychology|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Ned Block (1995). On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
David Bourget (2010). Consciousness is Underived Intentionality. Noûs 44 (1):32 - 58.
Declan Smithies (2013). The Nature of Cognitive Phenomenology. Philosophy Compass 8 (8):744-754.
Declan Smithies (2013). The Significance of Cognitive Phenomenology. Philosophy Compass 8 (8):731-743.
Brad J. Thompson (2006). Color Constancy and Russellian Representationalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):75-94.
Similar books and articles
Dedre Gentner (2010). Psychology in Cognitive Science: 1978–2038. Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (3):328-344.
Uriah Kriegel (2007). Consciousness: Phenomenal Consciousness, Access Consciousness, and Scientific Practice. In Paul R. Thagard (ed.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science. Elsevier.
Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1995). A Critique of Information Processing Theories of Consciousness. Minds and Machines 5 (1):89-107.
Anthony P. Atkinson & Martin Davies (1995). Consciousness Without Conflation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):248-249.
Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (1997). Cognitive Science and Phenomenal Consciousness: A Dilemma, and How to Avoid It. Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):269-86.
Alvin Goldman (1993). Consciousness, Folk Psychology, and Cognitive Science. Consciousness and Cognition 2 (4):364-382.
Antti Revonsuo (1993). Is There a Ghost in the Cognitive Machinery? Philosophical Psychology 6 (4):387-405.
David J. Chalmers (2004). How Can We Construct a Science of Consciousness? In Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences Iii. Mit Press. 1111--1119.
Michel Ferrari & Adrien Pinard (2006). Death and Resurrection of a Disciplined Science of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (12):75-96.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads8 ( #164,408 of 1,096,616 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #38,815 of 1,096,616 )
How can I increase my downloads?