David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Phiosophy of Science 60 (2):262-77 (1993)
Jerry Fodor has recently proposed a new entry into the list of information based approaches to semantic content aimed at explicating the general notion of representation for both mental states and linguistic tokens. The basic idea is that a token means what causes its production. The burden of the theory is to select the proper cause from the sea of causal influences which aid in generating any token while at the same time avoiding the absurdity of everything's being literally meaningful (since everything has a cause). I argue that a detailed examination of the theory reveals that neither burden can be successfully shouldered
|Keywords||Content Epistemology Language Mental States Semantics Fodor, J|
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Joseph Mendola (2003). A Dilemma for Asymmetric Dependence. Noûs 37 (2):232-257.
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