David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of the Social Sciences 21 (3):332-344 (1991)
The dispute between the empiricist and interpretivist conceptions of the social sciences is properly conceived not as a matter of reduction or covering laws. Features specific to the social sciences include the following. Explanations of human behavior make reference to intentional causation; social phenomena are permeated with mental components and are self-referential; social science explanations have not been as successful as those in natural science because of their concern with intentional causation, because their explanations must be identical with the propositional content of the mind of the actor, and because a social phenomenon exists only if people believe it exists. Elements of an apparatus necessary to analyze this problematic social ontology are given and include selfreferentiality, constitutive rules, collective intentionality, linguistic permeation of the facts, systematic interrelationships among social facts, and primacy of acts over objects.
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Frank Hindriks (2009). Constitutive Rules, Language, and Ontology. Erkenntnis 71 (2):253-275.
Hannes Rakoczy (2008). Pretence as Individual and Collective Intentionality. Mind and Language 23 (5):499-517.
Alison Gopnik (1993). How We Know Our Minds: The Illusion of First-Person Knowledge of Intentionality. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):1.
W. H. Dittrich & S. E. G. Lea (1993). Intentionality, Mind and Folk Psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):39-41.
Peter Ludlow & Norah Martin (1993). The Fallibility of First-Person Knowledge of Intentionality. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):60.
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