David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57 (1980)
What psychological and philosophical significance should we attach to recent efforts at computer simulations of human cognitive capacities? In answering this question, I find it useful to distinguish what I will call "strong" AI from "weak" or "cautious" AI (artificial intelligence). According to weak AI, the principal value of the computer in the study of the mind is that it gives us a very powerful tool. For example, it enables us to formulate and <span class='Hi'>test</span> hypotheses in a more rigorous and precise fashion. But according to strong AI, the computer is not merely a tool in the study of the mind; rather, the appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to..
|Keywords||Artificial Intelligence Brain Mind Program|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Robert C. Cummins (1977). Programs in the Explanation of Behavior. Philosophy of Science 44 (June):269-87.
D. C. Dennett (1975). Why the Law of Effect Will Not Go Away. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 5 (2):169–188.
Daniel C. Dennett (1978). Brainstorms. MIT Press.
James J. Gibson (1967). New Reasons for Realism. Synthese 17 (1):162 - 172.
Citations of this work BETA
David Bourget (2010). Consciousness is Underived Intentionality. Noûs 44 (1):32 - 58.
Ned Block (1986). Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):615-78.
Sean Allen-Hermanson (2013). Superdupersizing the Mind: Extended Cognition and the Persistence of Cognitive Bloat. Philosophical Studies 164 (3):791-806.
David J. Cole (1991). Artificial Intelligence and Personal Identity. Synthese 88 (September):399-417.
Paul Smolensky (1988). On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):1-23.
Similar books and articles
Saul Traiger (2000). Making the Right Identification in the Turing Test. Minds and Machines 10 (4):561-572.
Setargew Kenaw (2008). Hubert L. Dreyfus's Critique of Classical AI and its Rationalist Assumptions. Minds and Machines 18 (2):227-238.
Hans F. M. Crombag (1993). On the Artificiality of Artificial Intelligence. Artificial Intelligence and Law 2 (1):39-49.
Gary L. Drescher (1991). Made-Up Minds: A Constructivist Approach to Artificial Intelligence. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Geoffrey Brown (1989). Minds, Brains And Machines. St Martin's Press.
Karl Pfeifer (1992). Searle, Strong AI, and Two Ways of Sorting Cucumbers. Journal of Philosophical Research 17:347-50.
Margaret A. Boden (1988). Computer Models On Mind: Computational Approaches In Theoretical Psychology. Cambridge University Press.
Larry Hauser, Searle's Chinese Room Argument. Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind.
Larry Hauser, Chinese Room Argument. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads799 ( #143 of 1,410,230 )
Recent downloads (6 months)73 ( #967 of 1,410,230 )
How can I increase my downloads?