David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Routledge and Kegan Paul (1992)
Metaphysics of Consciousness , a volume in the series Philosophical Issues in Science , discusses the philosophical issue of the nature of consciousness. William Seager argues that the purely physicalist or materialist view of human consciousness is by no means disproved and is in fact strongly supported by some developments in artificial intelligence. William Seager proceeds by addressing the problems of consciousness that remain even for a minimal physicalism. The particular modes of subjective consciousness that constitute experience threaten a paradigm of scientific understanding, labelled "physical resolution," that prospers in all other realms of inquiry. A phenomenon is physically resolved by demonstrating that its components are made up of purely physical parts and its causal efficacy is grounded in the physical properties of parts. The apparent inability to resolve physical consciousness leaves it not only inexplicable, but inexplicable in a way that threatens even a minimal physicalism. This book is distinctive in its emphasis on the legitimacy of inexplicability and its argument that consciousness transcends the paradigm of physical resolution. It will be of great use to advanced students and lecturers in philosophy
|Keywords||Being Causality Cognition Consciousness Mental States Metaphysics Mind Ontology Physicalism Self Supervenience|
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|Call number||B105.C477.S42 1992|
|ISBN(s)||0415063574 9780415063579 0203213521 9780203213520 9781134923205 9781134923199 9781134923151 9781134923175 1134923198|
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Citations of this work BETA
William G. Lycan (2013). Is Property Dualism Better Off Than Substance Dualism? Philosophical Studies 164 (2):533-542.
Neil Campbell (2009). Why We Should Lower Our Expectations About the Explanatory Gap. Theoria 75 (1):34-51.
Ausonio Marras (1993). Materialism, Functionalism, and Supervenient Qualia. Dialogue 32 (3):475-92.
Neil Campbell (2000). Supervenience and Psycho-Physical Dependence. Dialogue 39 (02):303-.
Don Ross & John Thorp (1993). Qualia and Materialism: Introduction. Dialogue 32 (03):435-.
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