Plurality and continuity: an essay in G.F. Stout's theory of universals

Hingham, MA: Distributors for the U.S. and Canada, Kluwer Academic Publishers (1985)
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Abstract

by D. M. Armstrong In the history of the discussion of the problem of universals, G. F. Stout has an honoured, and special. place. For the Nominalist, meaning by that term a philosopher who holds that existence of repeatables - kinds, sorts, type- and the indubitable existence of general terms, is a problem. The Nominalist's opponent, the Realist, escapes the Nominalist's difficulty by postulating universals. He then faces difficulties of his own. Is he to place these universals in a special realm? Or is he to bring them down to earth: perhaps turning them into repeatable properties of particulars, and repeatable relations between universals? Whichever solution he opts for, there are well-known difficulties about how particulars stand to these universals. Under these circumstances the Nominalist may make an important con cession to the Realist, a concession which he can make without abandoning his Nominalism. He may concede that metaphysics ought to recognize that particulars have properties and are related by relations. But, he can maintain, these properties and relations are particulars, not universals. Nor, indeed, is such a position entirely closed to the Realist. A Realist about universals may, and some Realists do, accept particularized properties and relations in addition to universals. As Dr. Seargent shows at the beginning of his book. a doctrine of part icularized properties and relations has led at least a submerged existence from Plato onwards. The special, classical.

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Citations of this work

Against Instantiation.Christopher Frugé - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Kinds and essences.John Heil - 2005 - Ratio 18 (4):405–419.
The Logic of the Ontological Square.Luc Schneider - 2009 - Studia Logica 91 (1):25-51.
Moderate nominalism and moderate realism.Christer Svennerlind - 2008 - Göteborg, Sweden: University of Gothoburgensis.

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