David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Explorations 4 (2):66 – 94 (2001)
John Searle's forthcoming book 'Rationality in Action' presents a sophisticated and innovative account of the rationality of action. In the book Searle argues against what he calls the classical model of rationality. In the debate that follows Barry Smith challenges some implications of Searle's account. In particular, Smith suggests that Searle's distinction between observer-relative and observer-independent facts of the world is ill suited to accommodate moral concepts. Leo Zaibert takes on Searle's notion of the gap. The gap exists between the reasons that we have for acting and our actions. According to Searle, whenever there is no gap, our actions exhibit irrationality. Zaibert points out a certain obscurity in Searle's treatment of the gap, particularly in connection with Searle's notion of 'recognitional rationality'. Finally, Josef Moural examines the interactions between Searle's theory of institutions and his theory of rationality, with emphasis on the connections between intentionality and Searle's notion of the 'background'.
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References found in this work BETA
John R. Searle (1969). Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge University Press.
John R. Searle (1983). Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
David Hume (1739/2000). A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford University Press.
John R. Searle (1964). How to Derive "Ought" From "Is". Philosophical Review 73 (1):43-58.
Citations of this work BETA
Jonathan Way (2015). Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3).
Niko Kolodny (2008). The Myth of Practical Consistency. European Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):366-402.
Niko Kolodny (2007). How Does Coherence Matter? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):229 - 263.
Joshua Shepherd (2015). Deciding as Intentional Action: Control Over Decisions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):335-351.
Justin Snedegar (2013). Reason Claims and Contrastivism About Reasons. Philosophical Studies 166 (2):231-242.
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