David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy of Science Association 1992:481-491 (1992)
It has been argued that Psychological Externalism is irrelevant to psychology. The grounds for this are that PE fails to individuate intentional states in accord with causal power, and that psychology is primarily interested in the causal roles of psychological states. It is also claimed that one can individuate psychological states via their syntactic structure in some internal "language of thought". This syntactic structure is an internal feature of psychological states and thus provides a key to their causal powers. I argue that in fact any syntactic structure deserving the name will require an external individuation no less than the semantic features of psychological states
|Keywords||Externalism Language Science Syntax Thought|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Charles E. M. Dunlop (1990). Conceptual Dependency as the Language of Thought. Synthese 82 (2):275-96.
Andrew Pessin (1995). Mentalese Syntax: Between a Rock and Two Hard Places. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 78 (1):33-53.
Jürgen Schröder (1998). Knowledge of Rules, Causal Systematicity, and the Language of Thought. Synthese 117 (3):313 - 330.
J. E. Miller (1985). Semantics and Syntax: Parallels and Connections. Cambridge University Press.
Thomas D. Bontly (1998). Individualism and the Nature of Syntactic States. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (4):557-574.
Murat Aydede (1997). Language of Thought: The Connectionist Contribution. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 7 (1):57-101.
Denis M. Walsh (1999). Alternative Individualism. Philosophy of Science 66 (4):628-648.
Sean Crawford (2003). Relational Properties, Causal Powers and Psychological Laws. Acta Analytica 18 (30-31):193-216.
Jurgen Schroder (1998). Knowledge of Rules, Causal Systematicity, and the Language of Thought. Synthese 117 (3):313-330.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads11 ( #111,167 of 1,012,334 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #64,700 of 1,012,334 )
How can I increase my downloads?