The 'intrinsic nature' argument for panpsychism
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Thomas Senor
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Daniel Star
Jussi Suikkanen
Lynne Tirrell
Aness Webster
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
JeeLoo Liu
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Gualtiero Piccinini
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell Rowbottom
Aleksandra Samonek
Constantine Sandis
Howard Sankey
Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
Robin Smith
Daniel Star
Jussi Suikkanen
Lynne Tirrell
Aness Webster
Other editors
Contact us
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):129-145 (2006)
| Abstract |
Strawson’s case in favor of panpsychism is at heart an updated version of a venerable form of argument I’ll call the ‘intrinsic nature’ argument. It is an extremely interesting argument which deploys all sorts of high caliber metaphysical weaponry (despite the ‘down home’ appeals to common sense which Strawson frequently makes). The argument is also subtle and intricate. So let’s spend some time trying to articulate its general form
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