The 'intrinsic nature' argument for panpsychism
Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):129-145 (2006)
| Abstract | Strawson’s case in favor of panpsychism is at heart an updated version of a venerable form of argument I’ll call the ‘intrinsic nature’ argument. It is an extremely interesting argument which deploys all sorts of high caliber metaphysical weaponry (despite the ‘down home’ appeals to common sense which Strawson frequently makes). The argument is also subtle and intricate. So let’s spend some time trying to articulate its general form | |||||||||
| Keywords | STRUCTURAL REALISM | |||||||||
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