David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Inquiry 22 (1-4):253 – 280 (1979)
This article presents a sketch of a theory of action. It does so by locating the relation of intention to action -vithin a general theory of Intentionality. It introduces a distinction between ptiorintentions and intentions in actions; the concept of the experience of acting; and the thesis that both prior intentions and intentions in action are causally self-referential. Each of these is independently motivated, but together they allow suggested solutions to several outstanding problems within action theory (deviant causal chains, the accordion effect, basic actions, etc.); the demonstration of striking similarities between the logical structure of intentional action and the logical structure of perception; and the construction of an account of simple actions. A successfully performed intentional action characteristically consists of an intention in action together with the bodily movement or state of the agent which is its condition of satisfaction and which is caused by it. The account is extended to complex actions.
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References found in this work BETA
Roderick Chisholm (1966). Freedom and Action. In Keith Lehrer (ed.), Freedom and Determinism. Random House.
Donald Davidson (1973). Freedom to Act. In Ted Honderich (ed.), Essays on Freedom of Action. Routledge.
Stuart Hampshire (1983). Thought and Action. University of Notre Dame Press.
John R. Searle (1979). What is an Intentional State? Mind 88 (January):74-92.
Citations of this work BETA
John R. Searle (1980). Minds, Brains and Programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
Olle Blomberg (2011). Socially Extended Intentions-in-Action. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):335-353.
John D. Bishop (1986). Is Agent-Causality a Conceptal Primitive? Synthese 67 (May):225-47.
John R. Searle (1981). Analytic Philosophy and Mental Phenomena. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6 (1):405-423.
Michael T. Turvey, R. E. Shaw, Edward S. Reed & William M. Mace (1981). Ecological Laws of Perceiving and Acting: In Reply to Fodor and Pylyshyn. Cognition 9 (3):237-304.
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