David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
MIT Press (1992)
The title of The Rediscovery of the Mind suggests the question "When was the mind lost?" Since most people may not be aware that it ever was lost, we must also then ask "Who lost it?" It was lost, of course, only by philosophers, by certain philosophers. This passed unnoticed by society at large. The "rediscovery" is also likely to pass unnoticed. But has the mind been rediscovered by the same philosophers who "lost" it? Probably not. John Searle is an analytic philosopher, with some of the same notions as the positivists and behaviorists who rejected consciousness and "lost" the mind in the first place, but he also does not sound like the kind of reductionist who would have joined that crowd. His views, indeed, are sensible enough, and some of his insights so important, that it is a shame to find his thought profoundly limited by some of the same mistakes and prejudices that ruined philosophy, and not just philosophy of mind, under the influence of those positivists and behaviorists. There is enough of genuine value in his treatment, that it can easily be taken up and, with relatively slight modification, added to what is of permanent value in the history of philosophy.
|Keywords||Cognition Consciousness Linguistics Mind Philosophy Psychoanalysis Psychology Science|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$9.29 new (71% off) $20.64 direct from Amazon (36% off) Amazon page|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Ned Block (1995). On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
David Bourget (2010). Consciousness is Underived Intentionality. Noûs 44 (1):32 - 58.
William Lycan (2009). Giving Dualism its Due. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):551-563.
Karen Bennett (2003). Why the Exclusion Problem Seems Intractable and How, Just Maybe, to Tract It. Noûs 37 (3):471-97.
John I. Biro (2006). A Point of View on Points of View. Philosophical Psychology 19 (1):3-12.
Similar books and articles
Louise M. Antony (1997). Feeling Fine About the Mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (2):381-87.
John R. Searle (2004). Mind: A Brief Introduction. Oxford University Press.
D. Dubrovskii (2007). A New Discovery of the Mind?: On John Searle's The Rediscovery of the Mind. Russian Studies in Philosophy 45 (4):43-72.
Frederick M. Stoutland (1994). Searle's Consciousness: A Review of John Searle's The Rediscovery of the Mind. [REVIEW] Philosophical Books 35 (4):245-254.
Kevin J. Corcoran (2001). The Trouble with Searle's Biological Naturalism. Erkenntnis 55 (3):307-324.
Michel Ferrari & Adrien Pinard (2006). Death and Resurrection of a Disciplined Science of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (12):75-96.
Daniel C. Dennett (1993). Review of Searle, the Rediscovery of the Mind. [REVIEW] Philosophical Explorations 90 (4):93-205.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads131 ( #6,590 of 1,101,119 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #34,441 of 1,101,119 )
How can I increase my downloads?