David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Inquiry 36 (1-2):113-133 (1993)
I argue that Daniel Dennett's latest book, Consciousness Explained, presents a radically eliminativist view of conscious experience in which experience or, in Dennett's own words, actual phenomenology, becomes a merely intentional object of our own and others? judgments ?about? experience. This strategy of ?intentionalizing? consciousness dovetails nicely with Dennett's background model of brain function: cognitive pandemonium, but does not follow from it. Thus Dennett is driven to a series of independent attacks on the notion of conscious experience, many of which depend upon verificationist premises. I do not directly dispute the appeal to verificationism (though many would, I am sure) but rather aim to show that the sort of verificationist arguments that Dennett employs are fundamentally similar to classical sceptical arguments. The philosophical status of such arguments remains perennially unclear, but none of them produce conviction in their ostensible conclusions. I argue that Dennett's verificationist strategy suffers the same fate
|Keywords||Consciousness Epistemology Realism Scepticism Science Dennett, D|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Daniel C. Dennett (1976). Are Dreams Experiences? Philosophical Review 73 (April):151-71.
Daniel C. Dennett (1978). Brainstorms. MIT Press.
William G. Lycan (ed.) (1990). Mind and Cognition: A Reader. Basil Blackwell.
George Santayana (1955). Scepticism and Animal Faith. [New York]Dover Publications.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Charles Siewert (1993). What Dennett Can't Imagine and Why. Inquiry 36 (1-2):93-112.
Anthony A. Derksen (2005). Dennett's Rhetorical Strategies in Consciousness Explained. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 36 (1):29-48.
Jonathan Opie (1999). A Defense of Cartesian Materialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):939 - 963.
Timothy L. S. Sprigge (1993). Is Dennett a Disillusioned Zimbo? Inquiry 36 (1-2):33-57.
Dan Zahavi (2007). Killing the Straw Man: Dennett and Phenomenology. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):21-43.
John Bricke (1984). Dennett's Eliminative Arguments. Philosophical Studies 45 (May):413-29.
Michael Beaton (2005). What RoboDennett Still Doesn't Know. Journal Of Consciousness Studies 12 (12):3-25.
Michael Lockwood (1993). Dennett's Mind. Inquiry 36 (1-2):59-72.
Glenn Braddock (2002). Eliminativism and Indeterminate Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 15 (1):37-54.
Susan Schneider (2007). Daniel Dennett on the Nature of Consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. 313--24.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads12 ( #124,154 of 1,096,702 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #39,873 of 1,096,702 )
How can I increase my downloads?