Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (12):57-64 (2002)
|Abstract||I have argued in a number of writings that the philosophical part (though not the neurobiological part) of the traditional mind-body problem has a fairly simple and obvious solution: All of our mental phenomena are caused by lower level neuronal processes in the brain and are themselves realized in the brain as higher level, or system, features. The form of causation is|
|Keywords||Behavior Biology Dualism Metaphysics Property|
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