David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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History and Philosophy of Logic 30 (3):283-291 (2009)
This article opposes a view widely accepted in studies concerning the history of modal logic, according to which (i) the approach of C. I. Lewis towards constructing modern modal logic was purely syntactical (i.e. limited to the construction of axiomatic systems S1-S5 of propositional modal logic), and (ii) the notion of a possible world was incorporated into modern logic and philosophy mainly by authors such as Rudolf Carnap and Saul Kripke. The article presents Lewis' definition of a possible world, and his formulation of the truth-conditions of statements containing strict implication as their main connective in terms of possible worlds. The main question of the article is whether it is possible to consider Lewis' work in this area as an early stage of the development of possible world semantics, and if so, in what sense? The article concludes by answering affirmatively, due to soundness and completeness proofs with respect to S5 using Lewis' semantics
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References found in this work BETA
B. Jack Copeland (2002). The Genesis of Possible Worlds Semantics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (2):99-137.
Alvin Plantinga (1992). The Nature of Necessity. Clarendon Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Eric Steinhart (2013). Royce's Model of the Absolute. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 48 (3):356-384.
Edwin Mares (2013). A Lewisian Semantics for S2. History and Philosophy of Logic 34 (1):53-67.
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