Authorship of thoughts in thought insertion: What is it for a thought to be one's own?

Philosophical Psychology 28 (6):837-855 (2015)
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Abstract

In thought insertion, subjects experience thoughts which they claim not to be their own. What they claim, it is typically said, is that the thought is not theirs in the sense that they are not the agent or author of the thought. But what does it mean to be the agent or author of a thought? The most intuitive idea is that for a thought to be one's own means for the thought to causally originate within the subject. I defend this analysis against rivaling accounts and discuss several challenges that have not been recognized so far

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10.1080/09515089.2014.942897

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Max Seeger
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf

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References found in this work

Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
Self-reference and self-awareness.Sydney S. Shoemaker - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (October):555-67.
The Causal Theory of Perception.H. P. Grice & Alan R. White - 1961 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 35 (1):121-168.

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