Person perception

Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):245 – 262 (2008)
Peter Strawson holds that on a proper conception of personhood, the problem of Other Minds does not arise. I suggest that the viability of his proposal depends on a particular account of person perception. I argue that neither the theory theory nor the simulation theory of mindreading constitutes a suitable basis for this account. I then go on to defend Peter Hobson's notion of 'feeling perception' as an intersubjectivist alternative that, if properly developed, delivers a basis for a viable account of person perception. In developing that alternative, I draw on John Campbell's suggestion that self-understanding is constituted, in part, by an understanding of oneself as a cause of many events.
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DOI 10.1080/13869790802239201
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Axel Seemann (2011). Joint Motor Action and Cross-Creature Embodiment. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):279-301.
Michael Wilby (2012). Embodying the False-Belief Tasks. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):519-540.
Axel Seemann (2009). Why We Did It: An Anscombian Account of Collective Action. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (5):637-655.

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