Why We Did It: An Anscombian Account of Collective Action

Abstract
In this paper, I am concerned with persons' capacity for joint action. I start by suggesting that approaches which seek to account for that capacity in terms of collective intentionality face a problem: there are actions that clearly seem to qualify as collective even though the involved persons cannot be said to entertain an overarching 'We'-intention (however one characterizes this notion). I then go on to develop an alternative account of action that loosely draws on Elizabeth Anscombe's action theory and show how this alternative account can be applied to joint action. In so doing, I stress the importance of the phenomenal dimension of agency
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    References found in this work BETA
    Michael E. Bratman (1992). Shared Cooperative Activity. Philosophical Review 101 (2):327-341.
    Michael E. Bratman (2006). Dynamics of Sociality. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):1–15.

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    Citations of this work BETA
    Axel Seemann (2011). Joint Motor Action and Cross-Creature Embodiment. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):279-301.
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