International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (5):637-655 (2009)
|Abstract||In this paper, I am concerned with persons' capacity for joint action. I start by suggesting that approaches which seek to account for that capacity in terms of collective intentionality face a problem: there are actions that clearly seem to qualify as collective even though the involved persons cannot be said to entertain an overarching 'We'-intention (however one characterizes this notion). I then go on to develop an alternative account of action that loosely draws on Elizabeth Anscombe's action theory and show how this alternative account can be applied to joint action. In so doing, I stress the importance of the phenomenal dimension of agency|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Ben Laurence (2011). An Anscombian Approach to Collective Action. In Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.), Essays on Anscombe's Intention. Harvard University Press.
Axel Seemann (2011). Joint Motor Action and Cross-Creature Embodiment. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):279-301.
Nicholas Bardsley (2007). On Collective Intentions: Collective Action in Economics and Philosophy. Synthese 157 (2):141 - 159.
Sara Rachel Chant & Zachary Ernst (2008). Epistemic Conditions for Collective Action. Mind 117 (467):549-573.
Axel Seemann (2007). Joint Attention, Collective Knowledge, and the "We" Perspective. Social Epistemology 21 (3):217 – 230.
Boris Hennig (2006). Social Facts Explained and Presupposed. In Nikos Psarros & Katinka Schulte-Ostermann (eds.), Facets of Sociality. Ontos Verlag.
Frank Hindriks (2008). The Freedom of Collective Agents. Journal of Political Philosophy 16 (2):165–183.
Margaret P. Gilbert (2006). Rationality in Collective Action. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (1):3-17.
Sara Rachel Chant (2007). Unintentional Collective Action. Philosophical Explorations 10 (3):245 – 256.
Stephen Andrew Butterfill (2011). Joint Action and Development. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (245):n/a-n/a.
Added to index2010-07-27
Total downloads20 ( #61,609 of 549,715 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,450 of 549,715 )
How can I increase my downloads?