A preference for sense and reference

Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):73-89 (1989)
The topic of this paper is the semantic structure of belief reports of the form 'a believes that p'. it is argued that no existing theory of these sentences satisfactorily accounts for anaphoric relations linking expressions within the embedded complement sentence to expressions outside. a new account of belief reports is proposed which assigns to embedded expressions their normal semantic values but which also exploits frege's idea of using senses to explain the apparent failures of extensionality in the reports.
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DOI 10.2307/2027077
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Paul M. Pietroski (1996). Fregean Innocence. Mind and Language 11 (4):338-370.

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