David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Law and Philosophy 31 (5):523-563 (2012)
There is a controversy as to the moral status of an action in the face of uncertainty concerning a non-moral fact that is morally significant (according to an applicable moral standard): According to the objective conception, the right action is determined in light of the truth, namely the actual state of affairs (regarding the pertinent fact), whereas according to the subjective conception, the right action depends on the epistemic state of the agent, namely her (justified) belief (concerning the pertinent fact). A similar debate concerns the law, with respect to uncertainty regarding a legally significant fact. In this paper, I argue that moral and legal normative concepts are ambiguous and include two aspects: The ideal aspect, which is concerned with the constitutive feature of the normative standard, and the pragmatic aspect, which determines the correct action under uncertainty . With regard to each aspect, a different conception is appropriate: The objective conception should govern the ideal aspect and the subjective conception the pragmatic aspect. And the relevant aspect (and therefore the appropriate conception) depends on the question under consideration regarding the pertinent normative standard: what is its constitutive feature or whether an action is right (according to the applicable normative standard) in the face of uncertainty
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Re'em Segev (2013). Making Sense of Discrimination. Ratio Juris 27 (1):47-78.
Similar books and articles
Re’em Segev (2010). Sub-Optimal Justification and Justificatory Defenses. Criminal Law and Philosophy 4 (1):57-76.
L. B. McCullough (2012). Responsibly Managing Uncertainties In Clinical Ethics. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 37 (1):1-5.
Samira Guennif (2002). From Knowledge to Individual Action. Confidence, the Hidden Face of Uncertainty. A Rereading of the Works of Knight and Keynes. Mind and Society 3 (2):13-28.
N. K. Verbin (2000). Religious Beliefs and Aspect Seeing. Religious Studies 36 (1):1-23.
Eric Swanson (2009). How Not to Theorize About the Language of Subjective Uncertainty. In Andy Egan & B. Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press
Declan Smithies (2012). The Normative Role of Knowledge. Noûs 46 (2):265-288.
Avner Baz (2005). Moral Justification and the Idea of an Ethical Position. Philosophy 80 (1):101-123.
Tamar Schapiro (2001). Three Conceptions of Action in Moral Theory. Noûs 35 (1):93–117.
Holly M. Smith (2010). The Moral Clout of Reasonable Beliefs. In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Vol. I. Oxford University Press
Matthew B. O'Brien & Robert C. Koons (2012). Objects of Intention: A Hylomorphic Critique of the New Natural Law Theory. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 86 (4):655-703.
H. N. Pollack (2003). Uncertain Science ...: Uncertain World. Cambridge University Press.
Joshua Stuchlik (2013). From Volitionalism to the Dual Aspect Theory of Action. Philosophia 41 (3):867-886.
Added to index2012-03-24
Total downloads27 ( #143,694 of 1,899,871 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #466,347 of 1,899,871 )
How can I increase my downloads?