Graduate studies at Western
Synthese 170 (2):275 - 287 (2009)
|Abstract||In a number works Jerry Fodor has defended a reductive, causal and referential theory of cognitive content. I argue against this, defending a quasi-Fregean notion of cognitive content, and arguing also that the cognitive content of non-singular concepts is narrow, rather than wide.|
|Keywords||Intentionality Reductionism Sense Reference Narrow content|
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