A flawed conception of determinism in the Consequence Argument

Analysis 71 (1):30 - 38 (2011)
According to the Consequence Argument, the truth of determinism plus other plausible principles would yield the conclusion that we have no free will. In this paper I will argue that the conception of determinism typically employed in the various versions of the Consequence Argument is not plausible. In particular, I will argue that, taken most straightforwardly, determinism as defined in the Consequence Argument would imply that the existence of God is logically impossible. This is quite an implausible result. The truth or falsity of determinism is typically taken to be a contingent, empirical matter. But how could the empirical discovery that determinism is true lead to the conclusion that God’s existence is a logical impossibility? The defender of the Consequence Argument can avoid this conclusion, but only at the cost of making other similarly implausible claims. The objection..
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 23,201
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Leigh C. Vicens (2012). Divine Determinism, Human Freedom, and the Consequence Argument. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 71 (2):145-155.
Peter van Inwagen (2008). The Consequence Argument. In Peter Van Inwagen & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Metaphysics: The Big Questions. Blackwell Pub.
J. Melia (1999). Holes, Haecceitism and Two Conceptions of Determinism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (4):639--64.
Alicia Finch (2013). Against Libertarianism. Philosophical Studies 166 (3):475-493.
Jason Turner (2009). The Incompatibility of Free Will and Naturalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):565-587.
Richard Holton (2013). From Determinism to Resignation, and How to Stop It. In Andy Clark, Julian Kiverstein & Tillman Vierkant (eds.), Decomposing the Will. Oxford University Press

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

115 ( #37,930 of 1,940,948 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

8 ( #115,019 of 1,940,948 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.